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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Pretend play is the ability to escape the constraints of reality and visit different
worlds and possibilities that may seem distant to adults. Remarkably, young children
seem to accept the terms of this situation with little question. One of the key elements in
pretend play is the capacity to use substitution in pretend scenarios. Substitution refers to
an action where the pretender is able to use an object, for example a popsicle stick, and
act as if it is something else, e.g., a spoon to feed him or herself or a doll. This ability
has been demonstrated as early as eighteen months of age (Harris & Kavanaugh 1993)
and becomes more complex and integrated over the next several years. The
development of pretend play is an interesting issue in itself; however, pretend play has
also been hypothesized to be an important element in children's development of
creativity and cognitive abilities and has therefore become of additional interest to
reseai'chers. The majority of research on pretense has focused on the production or
imitation of these activities by the child, and less on his or her comprehension or
understanding of these actions. This emphasis is changing, however, as researchers have
discovered that through production of pretend play, comprehension may also be
assessed. Thus research on children's comprehension of pretense has provided another
window into the thinking processes displayed by young children as well as into their
understanding of real and imaginary events and the mental structures required to make
the distinction. Although research has begun in this area, there are still many questions
to be answered.
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A. The Development of Pretend Play
Many developmental changes are associated with pretend play. The different
stages associated with the changing structure of pretend play and the eventual ability to
engage in object substitution are summarized in this section, based mainly on work done
by McCune-Nicolich and Fenson (1984). In general though, the beginnings of symbolic
play can be observed during Piaget's sensorimotor period. By about 13 months of age,
children can substitute objects in pretense play highly similar to the referent that the child
is pretending it to be. For example, an empty cup may be used as a cup with tea in it.
These actions are based on the child's own daily activities and comprise single actions
involving only the child. Eventually, between 12-18 months of age, the child's activities
become less centered on the self. McCune-Nicolich and Fenson (1984) separate this
stage into two components; the first consists of object- and other-directed acts and the
second other-directed active play, that is, play involving other characters as active
agents. Other-directed acts (e.g., pretending to brush a doll or a mother's hair) can be
observed before object-directed acts (e.g., stirring a spoon in a cup). However, by 19-
24 months of age these two kinds of actions are reported to occur equally often in
pretend play (Fenson & Ramsay 1980). As the child approaches 24-30 months of age,
other-directed active play emerges. For example, the child will place a hairbrush in a
doll's hand in order for the doll to use it (Corrigan 1982). In addition to the actions
associated with the characters, at times emotions will sometimes be applied to these
"playmates," providing evidence for the child's understanding of the perceptions and
roles of others in the pretend episodes.
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Parallel to these stages is the development of integrated pretend play, in which a
solitary act (e.g., brushing the doll's hair) becomes part of a storyline employed within a
larger context (e.g., the doll is getting ready to go to school, so she has to brush her hair,
wash her face etc.). Although children at 19 months of age display "single scheme"
actions during their play (e.g., the same action used on two different characters) and
decontexualization (e.g., a greater ability to use a wider range of substitute objects)
appears, it is not until 24 months of age that the child produces multischeme actions
(McCune-Nicolich & Fenson 1 984) and therefore integrated pretend play. Multischeme
actions include successive actions (e.g., putting a doll on a pillow and covering it with a
blanket), and eventually planning of pretend episodes.
As already noted, the child's first demonstration of object substitution consists of
using objects that have a general similarity to their referents in both form and function.
For example, a child will initially use an empty container, but not a piece of paper as a
teacup (Jackowitz & Watson 1 980, Fenson & Ramsay 1980). One set of observations
that at first glance seems to contradict this initial limitation comes Irom an experiment
done by Mandler and McDonough with 14-month-olds (Mandler 2000). In this study
infants were shown a doll drinking out of a teacup. When these infants were given the
doll, along with the choice of a coffee mug or a fiying pan, they were just as likely to use
the fiying pan as the coffee mug to give the doll a drink. However, these results were
interpreted by Mandler (2000) as an overgeneralization of the "container properties" of
the fiying pan, rather than as a symbolic event. Children up to 20 months of
age disphy
overgeneralization of properties of objects. However, Mandler (2000) found these
errors to be domain restricted. In other words, the child was able to
incorporate certain
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properties of the fiying pan in their play behavior, such as it can hold liquid, which
allowed it to be used in ways that fit into the "container" domain but not in other ways.
For example, the child did not use a fiying pan to brush a doll's hair. These results
demonstrate that children can use substitute objects with an atypical fianction in their play
activity. Moreover, Mandler (2000) theorizes the child is not substituting the frying pan
for a cup; instead he or she actually thinks the pan, because it holds liquid, is acceptable
for giving a drink to the doll. In other words, the representational abilities involved in
object substitution later in development may not have been required here; instead the
child's choice could have derived from his or her knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of
objects and their acceptable uses.
By 19 months, as they gain more experience with a particular object's fiinction,
children are less likely to use the object as a substitute object if it has a different ftinction
from the intended play fiinction. However, they do begin to use items with ambiguous
identities. For example, they can pretend that a square block, which often ftinctions in
multiple ways during a child's play activities, is a bar of soap because the block does not
have a salient identity that interferes with it's pretended identity. In other words,
children do not need to ignore or modify information they have regarding the object in
order to pretend it is something else. Nevertheless, these objects usuaUy have a
similar
form or fiinction to the object for which they are substituting (e.g., the square
block is
very similar in shape to a bar of soap) (Jackowitz & Watson 1 980). After about three
years of age children are able to engage in substitution
involving items that have a salient
fiinction and do not necessarily share the form or fiinction
of the identity they are being
substituted for (ex. they can use a shoe as a "telephone")
(Musatti & Mayer 1987).
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B. Cognitive Significance
Pretend play is both interesting and entertaining, but does it serve other functions
for children? Children fi-eely engage in play activities throughout their development, an
activity that can provide a window into their thinking and understanding. Pretend play,
more specifically, provides an opportunity for researchers to investigate the early
emergence of certain cognitive abilities. There is some question as to what extent
pretend play represents children's cognitive capabilities. Vygotsky (1978) commented
that children could display certain cognitive behaviors earlier in their development with
the aid of a more cognitively advanced play partner as seen in pretend play. On the other
hand, Lillard (1993a) offers an opposing viewpoint, that although these children may be
performing at greater cognitive levels than is seen when they are outside of the pretense
activity, they do not truly understand the representations or mental states necessary for
the task. Therefore, this level of pretend play would not demonstrate children's early
abilities on understanding cognitive representations, but rather their understanding on the
specific task they were given.
In an effort to address this concern, Golomb and Cornelius (1977) took four-
year-old non-conservers and trained them with substitution tasks in pretend play after
they had been tested on both a liquid and a solid conservation task. This training
included acting on a substitute object (e.g., clay) in a way that conflicted with its
real
properties. For example, the experimenter initiated actions as if suggesting
it was a
"sausage." The children strongly objected to these actions, an indication that
the
children were not completely separating pretend fi-om reality.
The experimenter
prompted the children to explain their objections. Children
generaUy remarked that the
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experimenter could not eat the "sausage" because "although they were pretending it was
food, it was really clay." The next day the non-conserving children were again given
liquid and solid conservation tasks. This time they did significantly better on the
conservation task and better than a control group that did not receive the pretend
training. Golomb and Cornelius (1977) hypothesize that making the children describe
the transformations and explaining that the experimenter is pretending the clay is sausage
when in reality it is still clay, enabled them to extrapolate similar knowledge to the
conservation task. Pretend play may enable the child to acknowledge the reversibility of
objects in different settings. Although the child and experimenter could pretend the clay
was a "sausage" they could recognize the duality of the object; reality and make believe.
They could go back and forth between these identities to suit their play behaviors. In
other words, even though items can be transformed (by using pretense in the case of the
clay), realistically they do not change. By extension to the conservation task, even
though water is placed in a different container and "altered" in appearance, the actual
amount of water has not changed. The question still remains though, as to what this
task actually demonstrates. If indeed children were capable of conserving earlier than is
reported in previous research, pretend transformations seemed to allow the child to
understand the task in their own terms, perhaps eliminating the constraints of reality that
usuaUy inhibit them fi-om answering correctly. For example, in reality they assume that
the bigger something appears, the bigger it is. Yet, during pretense anything is
possible
and this rule is allowed to be broken. Once this has occurred they are open to
it
occurring in reality and therefore perform better on the conservation task.
Again, it is
hard to distinguish if children are truly learning and transforming
information fi-om the
6
pretense activity to the conservation task, or if some other mechanism is at work here,
enabling them to succeed at this task.
Perhaps an even more important role for pretense behavior in cognitive
development can be found in the development of theory of mind. Theory of mind refers
to an individual's ability to understand another person's point of view. In children this
ability does not seem to be established until about four years of age (Flavell & Miller
1998). According to Leslie (1987), pretend play provides a starting point for this ability.
Around 24 months of age, other-directed active play, which includes the ability of a child
to recognize emotional attributes of pretend play partners from his or her own point of
view, begins to appear. Leslie (1987) believes this form of pretense may be a precursor
to understanding the mental state of others. Pretend play allows the child to think about
how imaginary events may affect others (e.g., that if the child took away a toy from his
or her doll "playmate," the doll would be sad). The child could resort to and extend this
understanding to processing real events and eventually separate his or her own feelings
and emotions from those of others.
C. Theories of Object Substitution During Pretend Play
A role for pretend play in cognitive development seems quite counterintuitive.
The child is assumed to acquire an understanding ofhow the world operates from
experiencing the environment. The child must learn what categories objects belong to
(e.g., a dog is an animal) and what characteristics objects possess (e.g., a dog has a tail).
How then does the child abandon the restrictions on objects established by this
understanding in order to use them as substitutes in pretense? Leslie (1987)
proposed a
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decoupling model to describe the mental processing the child engages in during pretense
to explain his or her ability to engage in object substitution. Leslie ( 1 987) suggests that
children take their primary representation of an object (e.g., this is an empty cup) and
make a copy of it for use in the pretend setting. This copy, now involving pretense (e.g.,
this empty cup has tea in it) can be tagged, so it will not interfere with the primary
representation. Leslie (1987) claims that if children simply believed an object with a
known identity could easily take another identity, "representational abuse" would occur.
Representational abuse refers to overextension of the new identity into the child's real
life environment.
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) note several limitations to Leslie's (1987)
decoupling model. Specifically, they point out the need for a deletion process associated
with substitute objects during pretense. If a child pretends a banana is a phone for
example, he or she must not only make a copy of the banana to use in the pretend
situation, but also must disregard characteristics of the banana that could interfere with
the new identity assigned to it (e.g., the yellow color of a banana since a phone is usually
not yellow). Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) also point out that Leslie's (1987) theory is
centered on the object used in pretend play instead of the pretend episode itself In
contrast, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) emphasize the pretend episode, and a flagging
mechanism to differentiate the episode from reality. Harris and Kavanaugh (1993)
speculate that the pretend episode prescribes a directionality in terms ofhow a child uses
substitute objects in their pretend play. In other words, the pretend episodes encourage
the child to use some objects, rather than others as substitutes. It may be easier for a
child to realize the need for a certain object during a pretend episode (e.g., the need
for a
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cup if they are pretending to have a tea party) and to look for an object that fills this need
(e.g., a seashell), rather than choosing the object and placing an identity upon it (e.g., ifa
shell in fi-ont of him or her would help the child using it as a cup).
Lillard (1993a) addresses some of these concerns with her theory on object
substitution. Lillard (1993a) theorizes that object substitution, unlike Leslie's (1987)
decoupled model, does not involve a link between the real identity of an object with its
pretend identity in a single representation (e.g., "1 pretend the banana 'is a comb'.") and
therefore, there is no need for a deletion process. Instead the identities are maintained at
different cognitive levels. Reality lays the foundation for the children's pretense
activities and the identities they apply to the objects they use during this play activity.
Lillard (1993a) argues that either through action or mental representations, the real
identity of an object (e.g., a square block) may be "cognitively backgrounded" in
comparison to the pretend identity (e.g., a sandwich). In other words, the real identity
may influence or interfere with actions during object substitution. The child is aware of
both the real and pretend identities; they are, however, on different cognitive levels
(Amsel, Bobadilla, Coch & Remy 1 996). Lillard ( 1 993a) compares this to driving while
having a conversation. Implicit knowledge, like driving a car after many years, permits
an individual to be cognitively free to carry on a conversation though the fact of driving
is always present at some level in the mind. In other words, a child could pretend that a
block is a cookie yet maintain the knowledge that it is truly a block in the background,
and, therefore, not make the mistake of trying to eat it. Lillard's (1993a) theory
provides a clear division of real versus pretend identities, and explains why children are
unlikely to conftise the functions of the object in these different contexts.
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Pemer (1991) has offered still another alternative theory of pretend play. His
theory outlines an even greater distinction between reality and pretense then Lillard's
(1993a). Pemer (1991) proposes that children understand the difference between
pretense and reality. They knowingly control which mental state they are engaged in at
the moment and they also can switch back and forth between the mental states. Pemer'
s
theory differs from other theories, particularly with respect to his views on symbolism in
pretense. Pemer (1991) believes that while the child is engaged in pretense, he or she
treats the substituted object with a new identity, not as a symbol for its referent. For
example, a child using a popsicle as a toothbmsh is treating the popsicle "as if it were a
toothbmsh, not as a symbol for a toothbmsh. He argues that a tme understanding of
symbolization means that the substitute object would have certain characteristics of the
referent (e.g., bristles of a toothbmsh) and would be used by the child with these
characteristics in mind even though not actually present on the object. Pemer (1991)
believes children at a young age do not demonstrate this ability. However, Harris and
Kavanaugh (1993) argue against this interpretation based on their work done with two-
year-olds. AJready at this age, for example, children react to a pretend spill as if the
surface would now be wet. They act as if the pretend "container" had liquid in it and
when spilled would therefore have appropriate, specific consequences. Thus, during
object substitution, a child, with little hesitation, seems willing to attach the
characteristics of the real reference to the substitute and will even engage in an
appropriate action such as pretending to wipe up the spill. For Harris and Kavanaugh
(1993), these actions are evidence of symbolic abilities in young children.
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Another criticism of Pemer's position offered by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) is
that at any moment in a pretend scenario children are aware of the realistic constraints on
the objects they are using, a conclusion also reached by Lillard (1993a). The work of
Golomb and Cornelius (1977) showing children did not allow the experimenter to eat the
clay sausage supports such a position. Furthermore, neither Pemer (1991), Lillard
(1993a) nor Leslie (1987) discuss in any real detail a memory component to the act of
object substitution. How do children store this pretend episode in memory? Can it be
accessed later or is the memory lost once a pretend scenario is over?
To address some of these issues concerning symbolism, mental states, and
memory, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) presented objects with ambiguous identities (e.g.,
a popsicle stick) to 2 and 2.5-year-olds in two different scenarios (e.g., a dinner or
bedtime scenario). They asked the children to use the object according to an identity
given to it by the experimenter in each of the scenarios. For example, the experimenter
would hand the child a popsicle stick in the first scenario and say; "Show me what Teddy
does with his spoon," and in the second scenario "Show me what Teddy does with his
brush." Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) purposely did not use action words like "feed"
when requesting the action from the child. This was to ensure that the child was not
using verbal cues as the basis for acting out his or her understanding ofwhat was being
asked. They found that 2.5-year-olds were able to use different identities for the
substitute object in the two different scenarios. Children this age did not overextend the
identity given to the popsicle in the first scenario to that popsicle in the second scenario.
In contrast, two-year-olds produced substantially fewer pretend actions than the
2.5-
year-olds. Moreover, when they did not receive credit for successful use of a substituted
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object, they either failed to act out the identity with the substitute object or used it in a
literal fashion unrelated to the experimenter's request (e.g., the child placed the teddy on
the block instead of "feeding teddy" the block).
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) attribute the ability of the 2.5-year-olds to engage
in these different object substitutions in the two scenarios to the acquisition of a
"flagging mechanism." The child identifies the scenario as pretend, and attaches a flag to
the substitute object with certain stipulations during a given scenario. For example, a
child may have generated a flag indicating that, "During this scenario, this cup contains
pretend tea." This flagging process allows the child to incorporate reality and pretense
into a play episode. The child uses separate flags for an object in each of the different
scenarios, allowing him or her to keep track of each identity in the various pretend
episodes. According to Harris and Kavanaugh (p. 63, 1993), when the flagging
mechanism is applied; "... children attach a flag neither to a mental representation of a
specific prop nor to the mental representation of a prop's category but simply to a mental
representation of the current pretend episode."
These flags may be edited during an episode as well. If a cup with "pretend" tea
in it is spilled, the original representation will be altered to reflect this change and will
now represent a "pretend" empty cup. This editing allows for changes in the pretend
setting without causing confiision for the child in how he or she represents each object in
other contexts. These flags are stored in the child's representation of a specific scenario
and prevent the chUd fi-om engaging in, what Leslie (1987) called "representational
abuse." Overextension of the pretend substitutions is avoided because flagged identities
and the objects associated with them in each scenario are put aside and no longer read
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after the completion of a pretend scenario. The flags are not deleted from memory, but
are simply placed in long-term storage for access later. Thus, Harris and Kavanaugh
(1993) believe if the child is reintroduced to the same pretend scenario, the flags will be
reinstated for use once again, a prediction they never tested. They also conclude that
their work is the first of its kind to demonstrate children keeping track of multiple
substitutions.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY DESIGN
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) found that children at 2.5 years of age could
represent two identities for the same object, between scenarios, on the basis of
"flagging." Through this flagging mechanism the child could ignore the previous identity
applied to the substitute object, establish a new identity for it, and use it in the second
scenario without contusion. Yet, one anecdotal observation has offered limited support
to the view that children can pretend that a substitute object can have two identities
within the same scenario. Dunn and Dale (1984) described a dialogue between a two-
year-old and his older sibling. During a pretend episode the older child tells the two-
year-old that a cushion is at first a gate and later a tunnel. The younger child seemed
willing to attribute one particular object (the cushion) with two identities (as a gate, then
as a tunnel), but within the given scenario, not just between two pretend scenarios.
However, it is important to note that in this particular play episode the child could act
out the instructions from his older sibling with little demand for comprehension of object
substitution. That is, the two identities attributed to the cushion, a tunnel and a gate,
share similar acts involving locomotion; both are used to move through. In other words,
the child did not necessarily have to understand multiple object substitutions in order to
engage in the activity. These findings, however, highlight the need to follow up Harris
and Kavanaugh's (1993) original research and investigate the role that flagging different
scenarios plays in permitting object substitution.
In this experiment, in one condition 2.5 and 3 -year-old children were asked to
engage in object substitution involving two different scenarios using the same objects, a
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condition designed to replicate Harris and Kavanaugh (1993). In addition, a condition
was included to determine whether children these ages could use substitute objects in
pretend play when the objects had two identities within the scenario. Would children of
this age be capable of keeping track of substitute objects when they are unable to "flag"
the given identities by separate scenarios?
In their original work Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) included a very wide range
of age groups. For example, younger two-year-olds were between 24-31 months of age.
In the present study the age range for our younger children was narrowed between 29-3
1
months of age. Children in this age group were included in both Between-Scenario and
Within-Scenario conditions. Because 2.5-year-olds are assumed by Harris and
Kavanaugh (1993) to be restricted by the "flagging mechanism" during pretense, they
were not expected to be successful in the Within-Scenario condition. Thus, 3-year-olds
were also included in the present experiment. At this age children begin to engage in
object substitution spontaneously and are no longer limited by actual identities of objects;
for example, they can pretend a shoe is a car (Musatti & Mayer 1987). Given their
increased flexibility in engaging in object substitution, children three years of age should
be able to keep track of an object given multiple identities even within a scenario. If so,
their behavior would suggest an advance in the understanding of object substitution
relative to the 2.5-year-olds.
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) also suggested that if given the opportunity to re-
establish a pretense situation, children would be able to retrieve the flagged memory and
act accordingly with the substituted objects. However, they never tested this claim. In
order to shed light on this possibility the current study includes a memory phase. Gopnik
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and Slaughter (1991) touched upon the issue ofmemory in some research involving
theory ofmind that included a pretend task. Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) gave children
a stick and told them to use it as a spoon when the children were asked to pretend with a
bowl. They then changed the context of the play scenario by bringing the children to a
different table where a magician's hat lay and where the children were told the stick was
now a magic wand. When questioned later, neither 3- nor 4-year-olds had difficulty in
remembering either the first or second identity assigned to the stick. The 3
-year-olds
demonstrated an ability to keep track of and remember multiple identities for a single
object used during object substitution in a Between-Scenario condition.
Since 3-year-olds, according to Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) display an ability to
remember the two object substitutions, they serve as an important control against which
to compare the 2. 5-year-olds performances in the present study. No studies addressing
memory abilities in pretense have been done with this younger age group. The present
study's memory trials differed fi-om those carried out by Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) in
that the participants were not required to verbally recall the identities of the objects, but
rather, had to choose among various objects as to how they were used in the initial
pretense activity. For example, in Gopnik and Slaughter's (1991) study children's
memory was assessed by their response to the question; "When I first asked you, before
we moved over here, what did you pretend the stick was then? Did you pretend it was a
spoon or as a wand?" In the present study we assessed memory by verbally instructing
the child to select the object, which had been used in a specific way in a previous
scenario.
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Each child was asked to choose among the substitute objects on the basis of their
memory for the identities assigned to each object. Evidence of memory, especially in the
Between-Scenario condition compared to the WitWn-Scenario condition, would provide
further support for the importance of a flagging mechanism in children's pretense
activity. If children perform better in the Between-Scenario condition it would suggest
that their memory for an object's use depends on the flagging associated with scenarios
and is not linked directly to the object.
17
CHAPTER 3
METHODS
A. Participants
Participants were 5 1 children from the community surrounding the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst. Three children were excluded from the analyses for
failing to complete the experiment, when they refused to participate in the pretend
activity. The remaining children included twenty-four 2.5-year-olds (12 females, 12
males, age range = 29-31 months) and twenty-four 3
-year-olds (14 females, 10 males,
age range = 35-38 months). The children's names were obtained from birth records
provided by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The parents were contacted initially
by letter; a phone call then followed to recruit participants.
B. Materials
Testing took place in a research suite on the campus of the University of
Massachusetts. Two different window scenes served as backdrops for the two scenarios,
one suggesting daytime, the other nighttime. The scenes were displayed on two different
adjacent walls ofa4.8mx4mx2.5m room. A small wooden chair was located in
front of each backdrop.
The materials included a teddy bear named "Teddy" and a bowl, a pitcher and
teacup used during the warm-up phase. The four objects that were used for the object
substitution activity were a yellow block (4 x 4 cm square), a flat blue board (15x6 cm),
a white piece of paper (12 x 9 cm rectangle), and a red cylinder block (6.5 x 4 cm). A
video camera was used to record the children's behaviors.
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C. Procedure
The experiment consisted of four phases. Each child engaged in a warm-up
activity, an experimental activity, and a memory trial. These procedures were followed
by a free play phase. In addition, the parent completed a survey while the child was
engaged in the free play phase.
a. Warm-up phase
The warm-up phase included a pitcher and a teacup, objects that were not used ii
the later experimental phase to avoid modeling or interference for the child. The child
was placed in the middle of the room. He or she was told that we were going to be
"pretending" and was asked to pour some "pretend" tea from the teapot into an empty
teacup. The purpose of this warm-up phase was to introduce the concept of "pretend"
to the child as well as to familiarize him or her with a play activity before testing began.
b. Experimental phase
Children were assigned randomly to one oftwo conditions in the experimental
phase. The order of presenting the two scenarios (dinner or bedtime) in each condition
was counterbalanced. In each condition the child was seated on the floor facing one of
two chairs. Each of the chairs was located in front of one of the two backdrops
signifying the dinner or bedtime scenario. "Teddy" was seated in the chair relevant to
the scenario being acted out and was moved to the second chair when the second
scenario began.
Before beginning the first of the two pretend scenarios, the child was shown all
four objects and told that there was only one of each, to reduce the possibility that the
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child might think different exemplars of the same objects were being used with the two
scenarios. After showing the child each object, they were placed out of view and handed
to the child one at a time during the experimental phase.
In the Between-Scenario condition, the task was a modified version of one
employed by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993, experiments 3 and 4). In their work only
three objects were used for substitution in each of the pretend scenarios. However, in
the present study four objects were used. The number was increased in order to provide
a more systematic comparison of object substitution in the two different conditions. In
the Between-Scenario condition each of the four objects was given a different identity in
each of the two scenarios presented to the child. For the Within-Scenario condition two
of the four objects each had two different identities within the first scenario and the
remaining two objects had two different identities within the second scenario. Table 1
summarizes the object substitutions used in the Between-Scenario and Within-Scenario
conditions.
The instructions and procedure for the Between-Scenario condition were as
follows:
Dinner scenario: "OK. Now it's time for Teddy to go into the kitchen
and have his dinner."
Episode 1 : "Teddy is having his dinner. This is Teddy's sandwich (hand
child yellow block). Show me what Teddy does with his sandwich."
Episode 2: "Teddy is having his ice cream. This is Teddy's spoon (hand
child blue board with the bowl). Show me what Teddy does with his spoon."
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Episode 3: "Teddy is messy. This is Teddy's napkin (hand child white
piece of paper). Show me what Teddy does with his napkin."
**Episode 4: "Teddy likes sprinkles/chocolate syrup with his ice cream.
Here is a can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup (hand child red cylinder block). Show
me what Teddy does with his sprinkles/chocolate syrup."
** Although in piloting the term "sprinkles" did not seem to create
confusion for the children, during the present study, some children seemed
confused when asked to use the "sprinkles." Therefore, before the start of the
experimental phase it was necessary to ask the parent what their child was more
likely to comprehend, sprinkles or chocolate syrup. The "chocolate syrup"
identity was used interchangeably with the "sprinkles" identity based on the
parent's judgment of their children's understanding of the terms.
After completion of the dinner activity (if that scenario was presented &st), the child and
experimenter moved to the backdrop depicting the nighttime scene to engage in the
activity associated with that scenario.
Bedtime scenario: "OK. Now it's time for Teddy to go into the bathroom and
get ready for bed."
Episode 1 : "Teddy is having a bath. This is Teddy's soap (hand child
square yellow block). Show me what Teddy does with his soap."
Episode 2: "Teddy is getting ready for bed. This is Teddy's toothbrush
(hand child blue board). Show me what Teddy does with his toothbrush."
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Episode 3: "Teddy is ready to go to bed now: "This is Teddy's pillow
(hand child white piece of paper). Show me what Teddy does with his pillow."
Episode 4: Teddy likes a glass of water before he goes to sleep. This is
Teddy's glass of water (hand child red cylinder block). Show me what Teddy
does with his water."
The child was praised for his or her pretend activities.
For the Within-Scenario Condition, the presentation was altered slightly. This
was necessary to balance the objects and identities to avoid giving the child the same
object on two consecutive trials. For example, in the Between-Scenario condition if the
"can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup" (real object = red cylinder) was presented before the
"napkin" (white piece of paper) in the dinner scenario, in the Within-Scenario dinner
scenario the blue flat board would be presented on two trials in a row ("spoon" and
"napkin"). The instructions and procedure were as follows:
Dinner scenario: "OK. Now it's time for Teddy to go into the kitchen and have
his dinner."
Episode I : "Teddy is having his dinner. This is Teddy's sandwich (hand
child square yellow block). Show me what Teddy does with his sandwich."
Episode 2: "Teddy is having his ice cream. This is Teddy's spoon (hand
child blue board with the bowl). Show me what Teddy does with his spoon."
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Episode 3: "Teddy wants sprinkles/chocolate syrup with his ice cream.
Here is a can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup (hand child yeUow square block).
Show me what Teddy does with the sprinkles/chocolate syrup.
Episode 4: "Teddy is messy. This is Teddy's napkin (hand child blue
board). Show me what Teddy does with his napkin.
After completion of the dinner activity (if that scenario was presented first), the child and
experimenter moved to the backdrop depicting the nighttime scene to engage in the
activity associated with that scenario.
Bedtime scenario: "OK. Now it's time for Teddy to go into the bathroom and
get ready for bed."
Episode 1 : "Teddy is having a bath. This is Teddy's soap (hand child
white paper). Show me what Teddy does with his soap."
Episode 2: "Teddy is getting ready for bed. This is Teddy's toothbrush
(hand child red cylinder block). Show me what Teddy does with his toothbrush."
Episode 3: "Teddy is ready to go to bed now. This is Teddy's pillow
(hand child white paper). Show me what Teddy does with his pillow."
Episode 4: Teddy likes a glass of water before he goes to sleep. This is
Teddy's glass of water (hand child red cylinder block). Show me what Teddy
does with his water."
The child was praised for his or her pretend activities.
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c. Memory phase
The memory phase began after each child had completed both scenarios in the
experimental phase. The child returned to the original scenario and was told: "You did
such a good job the &st time, but he still needs your help." The four objects used during
the experimental phase were placed on the floor beside the child. Since the child needed
to select the object to be used to complete each episode in the memory phase, the child
was told the following:
Dinner Scenario
Episode 1
:
"OK. Now it is time for Teddy to have dinner again. I think Teddy
wants a sandwich. Show me what Teddy does with his sandwich."
Episode 2: "Teddy is having his ice cream now. Show me what Teddy does
with his spoon."
Episode 3: "Now Teddy needs a napkin because he is all messy. Show me what
Teddy does with his napkin"
Episode 4: "Remember Teddy likes sprinkles/chocolate syrup with his ice cream.
Show me what Teddy does with the can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup."
Bedtime Scenario
Episode 1 : "OK. Now it is time for Teddy to get ready for bed. He wants to
get clean. Show me what Teddy does with his soap."
Episode 2: "Time for the toothbrush. Show me what Teddy does with his
toothbrush."
Episode 3: "Teddy wants his pillow. Show me what Teddy does with his
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pillow."
Episode 4: "Teddy is thirsty again. Show me what Teddy does with his
water."
The child was praised for each pretend activity,
d. Free-play phase
A free-play phase occurred after the memory trials had been completed. In this
portion of the study, the child was shown "Teddy" and the four objects used previously
in the experiment and was encouraged to play with the materials in whatever way he or
she chose. The experimenter left the room for the 5 minute free-play phase, but the
video camera continued to record. The parent, who remained with the child, was
instructed to respond in an appropriate manner if the child approached her or him during
free play. However, the parent was asked not to initiate any play behavior with the child.
During the time the child was engaged in the free play activity, the parent
completed a survey consisting of questions concerning the child's play activities at home,
whether the child attended daycare or had siblings, etc. The survey questions parents
completed can be seen in the Appendix.
D. Scoring & Analvses of Data
The videotapes depicting the child's pretend activities were scored after
completion of the task. The camera was positioned in the comer of the room, at the
child's level, to be able to record the play activity in front of both backdrops, as well as
the child's facial reactions.
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During the experimental and memory phase of the experiment, the participant
was credited with a correct response, an incorrect response, or no response, concerning
the use of the substitute object. During the experimental phase a correct response was
scored when the child successfiiUy acted upon the object in accordance with the identity
it had been given. For example, for the statement, "Show me what Teddy does with his
spoon" the child was correct if he or she used the spoon to exhibit "feeding" teddy. A
descriptive summary of appropriate actions the child could initiate with each substitute
object can be found in Table 2. A correct response during the memory trials was scored
when the child successfully selected the appropriate substitute object based on its
assigned identity. The child was also scored in terms of using the substitute object in the
appropriate manor, regardless ofwhich item had been selected.
The child could use four substitute objects in an appropriate manor during each
of the scenarios in the experimental phase. There were also four opportunities to select
the appropriate object in the memory phase of the experiment during each of the
scenarios and to perform with the substitute object in the memory phase. In addition, a
measure was obtained based on the number oftimes the child used the four substitute
objects correctly in both scenarios.
Reliability was assessed by having a second person view the videotapes of the
children's pretend activities. The second observer viewed 60% of the experimental
sessions. Percentage agreement between the main experimenter and the second observer
(calculated as agreements/agreements + disagreements) was 99% for the experimental
phase, 94% in the memory phase where the child selected the appropriate object and
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96% in the memory phase when the child performed an action with the substitute object
that they had selected.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
A. Warm-up
Children had Uttle difficulty engaging in the pretense activity during the warm-up
phase. All children seemed to accept shifting from reality to pretense with ease, using
the pitcher to pour pretend "liquid" into a teacup.
B. Experimental Trials
Preliminary analyses were carried out to examine the effect of gender and
scenario order on performance using an ANOVA. There were no significant effects;
therefore, the data were collapsed over these factors. The mean number of correct
responses for each age group for the dinner and bedtime scenario can be seen in Table 3.
Both age groups performed well overall. A "no" response, where the children did not
respond when asked to demonstrate an action with the object handed to them, occurred
in only 9 out of 192 experimental trials for the 2.5-year-olds and 5 out of 192
experimental trials for the 3-year-olds.
The results shown in Table 3 indicate that despite the relatively good
performance by both age groups, 3-year-olds did better than 2.5-year-olds. A 2 (age) x
2 (condition) ANOVA demonstrated a main effect for age (F (1, 44) = 4.09, p < 05).
Three-year-olds were able to use the objects appropriately significantly more frequently
than the 2.5-year-olds. No significant condition or age x condition interaction was found.
The mean frequency with which the two age groups used the four substitute
objects correctly in both scenarios is shown in Table 4. As can be seen in this table, 3-
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year-olds were better at using a single object to represent two different identities during
the experiment than 2.5-year-olds. A 2 (age) x 2 (condition) ANOVA carried out on
these data revealed a main effect only for age (F(l, 44) = 4.03, p = .024). Once again
no significant interaction was found between age and condition. However, although 3-
year-olds were able to use the substitute object both ways well in either the Within- or
Between-Scenario condition, 2.5-year-olds had more difficulty doing so in the Within-
Scenario condition. In fact, a post-hoc t-test performed on the results obtained from the
two age groups in the Within-Scenario condition revealed that 3-year-olds performed
significantly better than the 2.5-year-olds (t = -2.64, p = .015). A closer examination of
the performance with the four objects revealed that in the Within-Scenario condition,
seven out of the twelve 2.5-year-olds were unsuccessfiil in using the 'yellow block' to
demonstrate the "sprinkle/chocolate syrup" action and five out of twelve of the 2.5-year-
olds were unsuccessful in using the 'white paper' to demonstrate the "soap" action.
These unsuccessful trials by the 2. 5-year-olds contributed to the age difference between
the Between- and Within-Scenario conditions. Two-and-a-half-year-olds in the Within-
Scenario condition either perseverated with the object (e.g., when presented with the
yellow block they used it as they had the blue board on the immediately preceding trial
(ex. as a spoon), or they used the same yellow block as they had used it before (ex. as a
sandwich)). On the other hand, errors on the "soap" trials in the Within-Scenario
condition were most commonly "no response" perhaps because it was not preceded by
any other activity in that scenario.
A major goal of the present study was to determine whether children who had
been given an initial identity for an object would have difficulty in then using it in a
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second way, particularly if the second identity had to be imposed within the same
scenario. To investigate this possibUity, the means of the children's performance on the
initial use of the object presented, was compared to their performance on the second
presentation of that object in both conditions. However, as can be seen Table 5, children
had little difficulty engaging in a second activity using the same substitute object. In
both the Between- and Within-Scenario conditions the first time the child used an object
did not seem to interfere with the second time they were required to use the same object.
Paired comparison t-tests for first versus second presentations revealed no significant
effect in either the Between-Scenario (/ = -.9, p >. 05) or the Within-Scenario condition
(^ = -1.14, p>. 05).
C. Memory Trials
Once again, in an ANOVA, no significant effects for gender or the order of
presentation of the scenarios were found and therefore the data were collapsed over
these conditions for fiirther analyses of performance on the memory trials. Table 6
shows the mean number of times the child correctly selected the substitute object on
memory trials that had previously been assigned that identity during the experimental
trials. Although performance by the two age groups in both conditions was somewhat
lower on the memory trials when they were asked to select the correct substitute object
than on the experimental trials when asked to demonstrate an appropriate activity with
the substitute object, children, nevertheless, did quite well in selecting the correct objects
to use in each scenario. Performance for each age group and condition was above
chance (2. 5 -year-olds in the Between-Scenario condition / = 8.67, p < .01, 2.5-year-olds
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in the Within-Scenario condition / = 7.72, p < .01, 3-year-olds in the Between-Scenario
condition / = 1 1 .29, p < .0 1 , 3-year-olds in the Within-Scenario condition t = 9.38, p <
.01). However, the results shown in Table 6 also indicate that both 2.5- and 3-year-olds
are performing less well in the Within-Scenario condition than in the Between-Scenario
condition during the memory trials. A 2 (age) x 2 (condition) ANOVA revealed a main
effect of condition (F(l, 44) = 1 1.9, p = .001) and no significant effect for age or
interaction between age and condition
The overall mean for using an object in an appropriate way during the memory
trials regardless of whether it was the correct object based on its assignment in the
experimental trials, was 7.25. This level of performance is very similar to the level
exhibited during the experimental trials. The means for each age group and condition
can be seen in Table 7. The 3-year-olds performed slightly better than 2.5-year-olds in
their choice of action after they had selected an object to use. A 2 (age) x 2 (condition)
ANOVA revealed a main effect for age (F (1,44) = 4.3, p = .045) but no significant
effect for condition or significant interaction between age and condition. Neither age
group appeared to have difficulty understanding what action they needed to accomplish
during the memory trial.
Table 8 shows the mean fi-equency for correctly choosing an object on the basis
of both identities given to it during the experimental phase. Children were more likely to
choose the same substitute object both times if they were in the Between-Scenario
condition than ifthey were in the Within-Scenario condition. In other words, if a child
was in the Between-Scenario condition, they were more likely to choose the yellow
block once in the dinner and once in the bedtime scenario correctly, than if the child was
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in the Within-Scenario condition where it was necessary to choose the yeUow block
twice in the same scenario. A 2 (age) x 2 (condition) ANOVA revealed a main effect for
condition (F(l, 44) = 11.49, p = .001). Neither the main effect for age nor the
interaction between age and condition was significant. Further investigation of the
results indicated that chUdren in the Within-Scenario condition had little difficulty
selecting the correct object to use when it was the first object assignment, but had
greater difficulty when it was necessary to select the substitute object in the second way
it had been used during the experimental trials (t = 2.57, p < .02). On the other hand, no
significant difference was found in the Between-Scenario condition (t = -.9, p >.05).
D. Free Play
Free play provided a window for the experimenter to observe how the children
interpreted the events ofthe experiment after it had concluded and to see if any ofthe
identities persisted in their play behavior. If children incorporated aspects of the
experiment into their own play activities, this would serve to indicate that they were not
only immersed in the act of pretense, but also were continuing to accept the identities
placed upon the substitute objects by the experimenter. Sixty-five percent of the children
engaged in a free play activity for 2 to 5 minutes after the experiment had ended. Of
these children 85% included aspects of the experiment in their free play activity. This
activity included feeding and putting the bear to bed, using the objects as the identities
given to them by the experimenter (e.g., the child picked up the white paper and placed
the teddy bear on top of it as a pillow), etc.. Only one identity was predominantly
chosen for each object during the free play episode; children rarely switched back and
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forth in applying both identities that had been given to a particular object during the
experiment while engaged in free play.
Children were more likely to engage in the free play activity if they had just
completed the Between-Scenario condition (83%) compared to the Within-Scenario
condition (48%) (F(l, 44) = 6.61, p = .014). This may help to account for the
observation that only one identity was associated with a particular object during the free
play phase. Overall, children readUy engaged in the free play activity and incorporated
aspects of the study into their play behavior.
E. Survev Responses
Correlational analyses were performed on the survey responses and the findings
obtained in the experimental and memory phases of the study. Table 9 reflects the
minimal amount of variation of parental responses on questions concerned with the
amount of play, specifically pretend play and television viewing. These responses did not
reveal significant correlations between the amount of time engaged in these kinds of
activities and performance by the children, except for parental interaction during pretense
and children's correct usage of the substitute object during the experimental phase (r
(48) = .3 1, p < .05). The higher the rating a parent provided for the amount oftime they
spent pretending with their child at home, the better the child performed in the
experimental phase. Because children performed so successfully in the experimental
phase, the importance of this relationship is unclear. The survey responses also indicated
that fifly-sk percent of the children involved in the current study attended day care at
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least two days a week. Sixty-nine percent had older siblings that Uved with them at
home.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
A. Object Substitution in Pretend Play
The present study was planned to further demonstrate the capabilities of children
as young as 2.5 years of age to engage in object substitution and pretend play, and to test
their memory for the substitute objects and activities, under two presentation conditions
that might permit evaluation of four current perspectives on pretense.
During a pretense task involving object substitution, children of 2.5 and three
years of age had little difficulty applying two different identities to an object, whether
asked to do so within the same or a different scenario. For instance, children were quite
capable of using the same piece of blue board as a spoon in the dinner scenario and then
as a toothbrush in the bedtime scenario, as occurred in the Between-Scenario condition.
Children were also able to use the piece of blue board as a napkin in the dinner scenario
even after they previously used it as a spoon in the same dinner scenario as occurred in
the Within-Scenario condition.
Three-year-olds did perform significantly better on the experimental trials than
2.5-year-olds. This was expected, considering the demands of the task. They may be
more advanced than 2.5-year-olds in understanding verbal instructions and actions, as
well as in maintaining attention to the task. Although the children in the present study
were capable of using all of the objects, the 3 -year-olds may have been better equipped
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to give more than one identity to each substitute object. Nevertheless, 2.5-year-olds
performed quite well.
Children had little difficulty applying two identities to the substitute objects in
either of the scenarios during the experimental phase of the experiment except for the
yellow block as a "can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup" in the dinner scenario and the white
paper as a bar of "soap" during the bedtime scenario. This difficulty was demonstrated
by 2.5-year-olds only, and in the Within-Scenario condition only. Three-year-olds did not
have the same difficulty. Jackowitz and Watson (1980) found that at younger ages, the
object the child is using needs to be similar in form or function to that for which it
substitutes and cannot have a highly salient identity of its own. By three years of age,
however, the child is less constrained by perceptual or functional relations between
object substitutes and the one it replaces. The younger children in this experiment may
have been influenced by this factor. The square yellow block may not have been as
similar in form or function as the cylindrical red block to a can of sprinkles/chocolate
syrup. The white paper also differed substantially from the prototypical idea of soap
(e.g., it was not thick and it was bigger than traditional soap). Overall, children may have
acted more appropriately during the Between-Scenario condition because more
prototypical objects, were used. For example, the red cylinder was used as the "can of
sprinkles/chocolate syrup" and the yellow block was used as the "bar of soap." In the
first case, the object was cylindrical and tall like a can; in the second, it was similar in
size and shape to soap. A future study is necessary to test whether the interference of
form or fimction played a role in children's difficulty with these objects and identities.
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The results of the experimental phase do not support the "flagging mechanism-
proposed by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993). According to their theory the scenario is
flagged, e.g., "in this scenario this block is a sandwich." Had this occurred with the first
substitution, the cWldren would have experienced confusion when it was necessary to
place an additional identity on the same object in the Within-Scenario condition.
Performance would be expected to decrease in this condition when using the second
identity, since the substitute object was already linked to an initial identity within the
scenario. However, this was not the finding.
Pemer's (1991) theory that during pretense, children separate pretend and reality
into two different mental states or representations, although plausible, does not seem to
fiilly explain the current findings of this study either. Differentiating pretend and real
identities would enable the children to apply multiple identities to an object, since they
would not be constrained by each scenario as is the case according to Harris and
Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism. By separating the two representations, the
children could focus on the pretend identity, disregarding the real identity of the object.
Therefore, they would have the fi-eedom to use it as they desired during the pretense
activity (ex. use multiple identities with the same object). However, one potential
outcome if children ignored the substituted object's true identity, is the possibility of
representational abuse, for example, children may have tried to "eat" the block
themselves in the case of the "sandwich" or "wash" themselves with the piece ofpaper in
the case ofthe "soap." Children in the current experiment seemed to have little difficulty
keeping track of the true identity of the substitute object during the pretense activity
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when they were supposedly engaged in what Pemer (1991) considers the pretend
representation.
The results of the present study lend support to more flexible theories like those
of Leslie's (1987) and Lillard's (1993a). LesUe's (1987) decoupler model provides an
opportunity for the children to make a copy of the original object (the real identity) and
to use it in a different identity (the pretend identity) with no interference from its original
identity. Children use this method in order to avoid representational abuse. For example,
as mentioned earUer, children could use a banana as a phone without thinking it is really
a phone outside of the pretend context. Since the decoupler model is not focused on the
scenario but on the object, it provides more room for the child to use multiple identities
for a substitute object both within and between the scenarios than does Harris and
Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism. An issue with Leslie's (1987) theory is whether
the pretend identity and the real identity of the object are linked together during
pretense. It is very possible that children could make multiple copies of the original
identity ofan object to be used during a pretend scenario, but Leslie (1987) does not
indicate how children would keep track of these multiple copies. There is also a question
of whether there is a deletion of the link between one identity and an object when a new
link is presented or if the link between the real and the pretend identity simply becomes
more complex (e.g. "this block is a "sandwich" or "soap""). In this case, children might
have a problem keeping track of the duplicate copies or the complex statement used to
identify the linked set of identities. The children in this study did not demonstrate any of
these difificuhies.
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The results of the experimental phase appear to be readily explained by Lillard's
(1993a) theory on "cognitive backgrounding." Past research has demonstrated that at
any point during a pretend play episode chUdren will rely on a realistic premise when
necessary (e.g., children will not attempt to eat a block when pretending it is a cookie).
The chUdren in this study performed no differently. After being handed each substitute
object they used it appropriately most of the time, even if this required them to use it
twice during the same pretend scenario. The flexibility of separating the real versus
pretend identities into different cognitive levels would allow the children to freely use the
objects with several identities during the pretense activity without losing sight of the
object's real identity. Lillard's (1993a) views on pretend play are not based on
propositions or distinct separations as are found in the other theories. Children are aware
of the necessary information related to the pretense activity (both real and pretend), but
they are guided by this information, rather than restricted by it.
B. Memory for Object Subsitutions in Pretend Play
The memory phase in this experiment was included to test Harris and
Kavanaugh's (1993) proposal that a child would have little difficulty remembering the
substitute object's identity after a particular task was complete if the proper cues were
given; and to determine whether memory for object substitutions would be similar for
both the Within- and Between-Scenario conditions. Each age group performed less well
in the Within-Scenario condition than in the Between-Scenario condition, although
participants still showed relatively good memory for object substitution even in the
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Within-Scenario condition. We found they chose the correct object for the first assigned
identity more often than for the second assigned identity. The difference between the
conditions is interesting and provides limited support for Harris and Kavanaugh's (1993)
position that flagging serves as a mechanism facilitating object substitution. There are
three reasons why this may have occurred.
One possibility is that using one object as two different identities within the same
scenario places a larger cognitive demand on the children of both age groups. They may
be able to store only the first identity of the substitute object, even though we know they
are quite capable of using the second identity when instructed to by the experimenter. As
a consequence, when cued in the memory phase to select the substitute object they used
earlier in that same scenario, children may simply fmd a suitable object for the ftmction
they need.
The second possibility is that children preferred to assign a more prototypical
object to the identity they were using. When given more control over the episode in the
memory task, merely asked to choose an object themselves, they may have ignored the
previous identity the experimenter applied to it during the experimental trials if another
object was considered more prototypical. For example, during the Within-Scenario
condition many children chose the white piece ofpaper when asked for the "napkin" in
the dinner scenario rather than the blue board that was the item actually used during the
experimental phase as the "napkin." Perhaps children chose this object because it more
closely resembled an actual napkin than a flat, wooden, blue board. The children's
preference to select objects more highly similar in form or ftinction to the pretend
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identity could make it difficult during the Within-Scenario condition to select an object
multiple times. For example, the blue board may have been more similar in form to a
"spoon" but not as similar to a "napkin" and the children's performance may have
reflected this dilference.
An explanation linked to Harris and Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism
provides another possibUity for explaining these results. Perhaps memory for object
substitution is influenced by the context in which the substitution is implemented, even if
the children's abilities to use the substitute object during the original play episodes are
not. Rovee-Collier (2000) trained infants with a mobile above their cribs, which moved
when they kicked. On the side of the crib, within the baby's view, she placed either a red
or a blue drapery. When presented with the same mobile and the same color drapery,
after a delay, the infants kicked their feet. This footkick response demonstrated that
these infants retained the memory of the earlier training. However, if the drapery color
was changed, a contextual difference, the infants did not kick their feet. The change in
context interrupted the retrieval of the relevant information necessary in order to respond
properly to the stimulus of the mobile. Rovee-Collier, Schechter, Shyi & Shields (1992)
theorize that memory is ordered, with context as an important filtering mechanism for
the rest of the system; "Thus, attention to potential retrieval cues is first filtered or
screened at the level of the context, and perceptual identification of appropriate retrieval
cues in the context permits attention to flow to the next level (the focal cue)." From this
perspective, the contextual cues serve in much the same way as Harris and Kavanaugh's
(1993) flagging mechanism and their views concerning a flagging mechanism's beneficial
role during pretense. If children were flagging the pretend scenario, the scenario itself
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would serve as the context upon which children base their memory representation. When
two identities are assigned to a given substitute object during the same context (or
scenario) the children may form a memory representation of the first relationship, but
may have difficulties with the second one because the context has been assigned to the
first association.
Many studies of state-dependent learning also relate to the analyzing of context
effects in memory, demonstrated in object substitution during play. In many respects,
the contexts in which pretense occurs is further illustrated by the findings showing the
importance of state-dependent learning. State-dependent learning refers to the increased
abilities of individuals to retain information in the same contexts in which they were
given the initial information (Eich 2000). For example, Godden and Baddeley (1975)
performed a study where participants learned a list ofwords either under water or on
land. If these participants were tested after a delay within the same context (water or
land) in which they had learned the words, they performed significantly better. A study
completed by Bjork and Richardson-Klavehn (1989) proves especially relevant to our
study. During their experimental phase, Bjork and Richardson-Klavehn ( 1 989) asked the
participants to memorize two separate lists of words, during two different study sessions.
These words were presented either within the same context (physically the same place)
for each of the two sessions, or between two different contexts (physically two different
places) for each of the two sessions and all the participants were eventually tested in a
neutral setting. They found that recall was significantly better when the participants
memorized the lists in different contexts than when they memorized the same lists within
the same context, even at different study sessions.
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Bjork and Richardson-Klavehn's (1989) findings provide support for the
importance of distinctive contexts for memory. It appears that the most optimal method
of learning multiple items (or identities in our case) would be to do so using multiple
contexts, as the children demonstrated in the Between-Scenario condition. Rovee-Collier
(2000) demonstrated infants' use of context in memory, Bjork and Richardson-KIavehn
(1989) did so with younger adults and Schramke and Bauer (1997) tested 60 - 80-year-
olds and also found that context is strongly associated with recall abilities, to suggest
that adults "are automatically storing and retrieving contextual information...(p 260)."
Context remains an important aid in our memory processes throughout our lives and it
seems quite plausible that children would find it more difficult to learn and store
information about two identities being applied to one substitute object when different
contexts (scenarios) are not available to provide them retrieval cues. Harris and
Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism seems to offer an explanation similar to this
viewpoint emphasizing the importance of state-dependent effects, as seen in the memory
phase of the current study; Thus, this mechanism may provide an explanation for the
children's behavior when remembering multiple identities within the same scenario.
In conclusion, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) seemed to have overestimated the
importance of a flagging mechanism for object substitution during pretense. However,
the mechanism may provide some explanation for how these children retrieve the
memories for the identities of the objects after they take part in the pretend scenarios.
Both 2.5 and 3 -year-olds were able to use substitute objects appropriately in two
different identities, both between and within a given scenario. Even though their
performance on the memory trials did decline, children were able to choose the
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appropriate objects to use during a scenario the majority of the time in both scenarios,
and had little difficulty using these substitute objects after they had chosen them.
Children of this age seem quite willing and capable of applying several identities to a
substitute object during a pretend activity, though they may have some diminished
memory for or capacity to choose the appropriate substitute object in more than one
way. Future research goals include explaining the thinking that underlies the behavior of
these children, not only in experimental settings, but also during pretense activities in
general.
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Table 1: Object Substitutions in the Between- and Within-Scenario Conditions
Between-Scenario
Yellow Block
Flat Blue Board
White Paper
Red Cylinder
Within-Scenario
Yellow Block
Flat Blue Board
White Paper
Red Cylinder
Dinner Scenario
Sandwich
Spoon
Napkin
Can of Sprinkles/
Chocolate Syrup
Sandwich
Can of Sprinkles/
Chocolate Syrup
Spoon
Napkin
Bedtime Scenario
Soap
Toothbrush
Pillow
Glass of Water
Soap
PiUow
Toothbrush
Glass of Water
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Table 2: Appropriate Actions for Substituted Objects in the Experimental and Memory
Trials
Dinner
Sandwich
Spoon
Napkin
Appropriate Actions
Act as if "feeding" the bear, place the object
near his mouth, make eating noises
Same as above, but also incorporate
"scooping" motion with "spoon"
Act as if "cleaning" the bear, bring the object
to the face and rub back and forth
Can of Sprinkles/Chocolate
Syrup
Act as if "pouring" sprinkles into bowl, raising
object above bowl and shaking
Bedtime Identity Appropriate Actions
Soap Act as if "washing" the bear, place object on and rub
back and forth
Toothbrush Act as if "brushing" the bear's teeth, bring object to
mouth and move back and forth
PiUow Placing the bear's head on top of the pillow as if going
to "sleep"
Glass of Water Bring the object to the bear's mouth, make drinking no
Noise
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Table 3: Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Appropriate Actions on the
Experimental Trials by Age and Condition
Dinner Bedtime Total Correct
Responses
2.5-year-olds
Between-Scenario 3.6 (.79) 3.6 (.67) 7.2
Within-Scenario 3.3 (.75) 3.6 (.52) 6.9
3-year-olds
Between-Scenario 3.6 (.51) 3.9 (.30) 7.5
Within-Scenario 3.8 (.60) 3.9 (.38) 7.7
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Table 4: Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Correct Actions for Both Object
Identities During Experimental Trials by Age and Condition
.
Between-Scenario Within-Scenario
2.5-year-olds 3.25 (1.10) 2.75 (.87)
3-year-olds 3.6 (.69) 3.6 (.77)
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Table 5: Successful Mean Actions (and Standard Deviations) on the First vs. Second
Presentations of the Substitute Objects During Experimental Trials by Age and
Condition
First Presentation Second Presentation
2.5-year-olds
Between-Scenario
Within-Scenario
3
-year-olds
Between-Scenario
Within-Scenario
Totals:
3.4 (.79)
3.6 (.52)
3.8 (.41)
3.9 (.38)
14.7
3.8 (.62)
3.3 (.75)
3.7 (.47)
3.8 (.60)
14.6
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Table 6: Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Correct Object Choices on
Memory Trials by Age and Condition
Dinner Bedtime Total Correct Responses
2. 5
-year-olds
Between-Scenario 3.3 (.65) 2.8(1.42) 6.1
Within-Scenario 2.2 (.72) 2.9 (.99) 5.1
3
-year-olds
Between-Scenario 3.5 (.82) 3.2 (.98) 6.7
Within-Scenario 2.4 (.77) 2.7 (.77) 5.1
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Table 7: Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Appropriate Object Actions
During the Memory Trials by Age and Condition
- Between-Scenario Within-Scenario
2.5-year-olds 7.3 (.87) 6.8 (.94)
3-year-olds 7.4 (.92) 7.7 (.48)
51
Table 8: Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Correct Choices
Identities During the Memory Trials by Age and Condition
— Between-Scenario Within-Scenario
2.5-year-olds 2.33 (1.44) 1.50(1.0)
3-year-olds 2.73 ( 1.1) 1.23 (1.17)
52
Table 9: Parental Ratings (and Standard Deviations) of Children's Home
Behaviors
2.5-vear-olds 3-vear-olds
A. Play participation 4.6 (.58) 4.8 (.44)
B. Television viewing 3.0 (.81) 3.2 (.42)
C. Pretend activities 3.9 (.88) 4.5 (.72)
D. Object substitution 3.8 (.96) 3.9 (.72)
in pretense
E. Sibling interaction 3.7(1.1) 3.4(1.3)
in pretense
F. Parental interaction 3.6 (.72) 3.7 (.82)
in pretense
*
The scale ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (very often)
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APPENDIX
SURVEY QUESTIONS DISTRIBUTED TO PARENTS
1) Does your chUd have any siblings that live in the same household as him or her? Y / N
If so, what gender and how old?
2) Does your child attend daycare? Y / N
If so for how many days/hrs. a week?
3) Please rate the following questions between 1 and 5 according to the scale below.
1 = never 2 = almost never 3 = sometimes 4 = often 5 = very often
A. How often is your child engaged in play activities?
1 2 3 4 5
B. Does your child watch television?
1 2 3 4 5
C. Does your child engage in pretend activities at home?
1 2 3 4 5
D. How often do they use object substitution at home during pretend activities?
1 2 3 4 5
E. If siblings, how often do they interact with them in a pretend setting?
1 2 3 4 5 N/A
F. How often do you engage in pretend play with your child?
1 2 3 4 5
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